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SYMPOSIUM
FOREWORD:  SOME  PUZZLES  OF  STATE  STANDING
Tara Leigh Grove*
When should states have standing?  In recent years, there has been an
explosion in literature on that question.1  Yet, even today, there seem to be as
many questions as answers.  In this Foreword to the Notre Dame Law Review’s
2019 Federal Courts, Practice, and Procedure Symposium on state standing, I
discuss a few such puzzles.  First, should states have “special” standing when
they sue the federal government—that is, greater access to federal court than
private parties?  Second, and conversely, should states have at least “equal”
access to federal court, or should they face more barriers than private par-
ties?  These questions are at the heart of the literature on state standing,
including the excellent contributions to this Symposium.
I. PUZZLE ONE: SPECIAL STANDING?
In Massachusetts v. EPA, the Supreme Court held that the State had
standing to challenge the Environmental Protection Agency’s failure to regu-
late greenhouse gas emissions.2  In so doing, the Court declared that the
© 2019 Tara Leigh Grove.  Individuals and nonprofit institutions may reproduce and
distribute copies of this Foreword in any format at or below cost, for educational purposes,
so long as each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to the Notre Dame Law Review,
and includes this provision in the copyright notice.
* Professor of Law and Cabell Research Professor, William and Mary Law School.
1 For a sample (in addition to the excellent pieces in this Symposium), see Jessica
Bulman-Pozen, Federalism All the Way Up: State Standing and “The New Process Federalism,” 105
CALIF. L. REV. 1739 (2017); Seth Davis, The New Public Standing, 71 STAN. L. REV. (forthcom-
ing 2019); Tara Leigh Grove, When Can a State Sue the United States?, 101 CORNELL L. REV.
851 (2016); F. Andrew Hessick & William P. Marshall, State Standing to Constrain the Presi-
dent, 21 CHAP. L. REV. 83 (2018); Jonathan Remy Nash, Sovereign Preemption State Standing,
112 NW. U. L. REV. 201 (2017); Shannon M. Roesler, State Standing to Challenge Federal
Authority in the Modern Administrative State, 91 WASH. L. REV. 637 (2016); Stephen I. Vladeck,
States’ Rights and State Standing, 46 U. RICH. L. REV. 845 (2012); sources cited infra note 14.
Prior to the recent wave of scholarship, the seminal work—and still a must-read for anyone
who writes in this area—was Ann Woolhandler & Michael G. Collins, State Standing, 81 VA.
L. REV. 387 (1995).
2 Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 519–21 (2007).
1883
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State was “entitled to special solicitude in our standing analysis.”3  Since that
2007 decision, scholars have debated precisely what the Court meant by that
“special solicitude” statement (and even whether the State’s “special” status
mattered to the holding in that case).4  But, whatever the proper interpreta-
tion, the case spurred an explosion in commentary and, it seems, litigation.5
Much of the commentary has focused on the extent to which a state has
a “special” power to sue the federal executive branch.  As many scholars have
observed, in upholding state standing in Massachusetts, the Court suggested
that “states should be accorded special access to federal court in order to
challenge federal agency action” and inaction.6  In other words, states may
bring suit to contest the federal executive’s handling of federal law, even
when other litigants cannot.
States themselves seem to be taking full advantage of that opportunity.
State suits against the federal executive have risen dramatically in recent
years, particularly during the Obama and Trump administrations.7  These
“State v. United States” cases have alleged that the federal executive flouted
3 Id. at 520; see id. at 504–06.
4 The Court purported to apply the typical injury-in-fact, causation, and redressability
test. See id. at 520–26 (concluding that the gradual loss of Massachusetts’s coastline was a
“particularized injury” that was traceable to the EPA’s failure to regulate and suggesting
that regulation by the EPA could “slow or reduce” global warming as well as the risk to
Massachusetts’s coastline (emphasis omitted)).  But many observers, including the dissent-
ers in Massachusetts, have asserted that the Court applied a relaxed standard at all three
stages of the standing analysis.  See id. at 536, 547–48 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (criticizing
the Court for “[r]elaxing Article III standing requirements because asserted injuries are
pressed by a State”); see also, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Fragmentation of Standing, 93
TEX. L. REV. 1061, 1082 (2015) (asserting that the “important point” from Massachusetts v.
EPA was that the Court “either recognized or introduced special standing rules for states
suing to protect their property and other quasi-sovereign interests”).
5 There are likely multiple reasons for the recent explosion in state lawsuits against
the federal executive.  But the Massachusetts decision appears to be one factor. See PAUL
NOLETTE, FEDERALISM ON TRIAL: STATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL AND NATIONAL POLICYMAKING IN
CONTEMPORARY AMERICA 21 (2015) (documenting the rise in multistate litigation); Note,
An Abdication Approach to State Standing, 132 HARV. L. REV. 1301, 1306 (2019) (attributing
the rise to the Massachusetts decision).
6 Gillian E. Metzger, Federalism and Federal Agency Reform, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 67–68
(2011); see also Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Federalism as a Safeguard of the Separation of Powers, 112
COLUM. L. REV. 459, 494–95 (2012) (noting that Massachusetts “may suggest a broad role
for states in challenging federal executive action—and federal executive inaction,”
although expressing uncertainty about the decision’s long-term impact); Dru Stevenson,
Special Solicitude for State Standing: Massachusetts v. EPA, 112 PENN ST. L. REV. 1, 73–74
(2007) (“This ‘special solicitude’ rule gives states a favored status when bringing suits
against federal administrative agencies.”).
7 See Alan Neuhauser, State Attorneys General Lead the Charge Against President Donald
Trump, U.S. NEWS (Oct. 27, 2017), https://www.usnews.com/news/best-states/articles/
2017-10-27/state-attorneys-general-lead-the-charge-against-president-donald-trump; supra
note 5.
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the will of Congress in various areas, including the environment,8 immigra-
tion,9 and health insurance.10
In his contribution to this Symposium, Ernest Young applauds this trend
in intergovernmental litigation, contending that states should have consider-
able leeway to challenge federal executive action and inaction.11  Andrew
Hessick, for his part, argues that the bar on parens patrie cases should be
lifted; states should be able to sue on behalf of their citizens to contest fed-
eral conduct that violates constitutional or statutory commands.12  Bradford
Mank and Michael Solimine agree that courts should apply “somewhat
relaxed criteria,” when states bring suit against the federal executive.13  This
work supplements a string of recent scholarship, which has likewise advo-
cated special state standing to challenge the manner in which the federal
executive implements federal law.14
8 See, e.g., Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 505–06 (upholding state standing in a suit chal-
lenging the EPA’s failure to regulate motor vehicle emissions).
9 See Texas v. United States, 787 F.3d 733, 743, 748–54 (5th Cir. 2015) (upholding
state standing to challenge the Obama administration’s Deferred Action for Parents of
Americans and Lawful Permanent Residents program), aff’d per curiam by an equally divided
court, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016); see also Texas v. United States, 328 F. Supp. 3d 662, 671 & n.1,
690–705 (S.D. Tex. 2018) (upholding state standing in a suit demanding that the Trump
administration rescind the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals program).
10 See Pennsylvania v. Trump, 351 F. Supp. 3d 791, 797–98, 801–03, 804–08 (E.D. Pa.
2019), appeals docketed, No. 19-1189 (3d Cir. Jan. 24, 2019), No. 19-1129 (3d Cir. Jan. 23,
2019); California v. Health & Hum. Servs., 351 F. Supp. 3d 1267, 1270–71, 1281–84 (N.D.
Cal. 2019) (upholding state standing to challenge the Trump administration’s regulations
that make it easier for employers to claim a religious or moral exemption to providing
health insurance coverage for contraceptives; States arguing regulations violate the Afford-
able Care Act), appeal docketed sub nom. California v. March for Life, No. 19-15150 (9th Cir.
Jan. 28, 2019).
11 See Ernest A. Young, State Standing and Cooperative Federalism, 94 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1893, 1893–96, 1921–25 (2019) (advocating broad state standing to challenge federal pol-
icy).  To be sure, Young asserts that states will often have standing, even absent special
rules. See id. at 1897–98; see also infra Part II (discussing the puzzle of “equal” state
standing).
12 See F. Andrew Hessick, Quasi-Sovereign Standing, 94 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1927,
1927–29 (2019); id. at 1935–36 (asserting that although “the beneficiaries of these quasi-
sovereign interests are the populace of the state,” “it is the state that holds and acts on
these interests to protect the populace”).  In Massachusetts v. Mellon, the Supreme Court
announced that a state cannot bring a parens patriae action against the federal govern-
ment—that is, the state may not act as the representative of private citizens to enforce their
federal rights.  262 U.S. 447, 485–86 (1923).  There is considerable disagreement over the
scope of that prohibition, including whether it is a constitutional or only a prudential bar.
See Ann Woolhandler, Governmental Sovereignty Actions, 23 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 209,
225–26, 225 n.88 (2014) (noting the debate over this issue).
13 Bradford Mank & Michael E. Solimine, State Standing and National Injunctions, 94
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1955, 1956 (2019).
14 See, e.g., Bradford Mank, Should States Have Greater Standing Rights than Ordinary Citi-
zens?: Massachusetts v. EPA’s New Standing Test for States, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1701,
1771–72 (2008) (agreeing with “the Massachusetts majority that states [may bring suit] if
the federal government has allegedly failed to perform a statutory or constitutional duty”);
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Mank and Solimine, along with Jonathan Nash, ask whether this reason-
ing should extend to the area of remedy, recognizing that many of the
debates over state standing intersect with the ongoing debates over national
injunctions against the federal executive.15  In careful and thoughtful essays,
these commentators do not advocate any hard-and-fast rules.  But they sug-
gest that, under certain (limited) circumstances, courts should be more will-
ing to grant nationwide relief when the lawsuit is brought by a state (or
multiple states).16
Calvin Massey, State Standing After Massachusetts v. EPA, 61 FLA. L. REV. 249, 252, 276
(2009) (arguing that broad state standing “does no more than ensure that executive discre-
tion is confined within the boundaries of the Constitution and federal law”); Jonathan
Remy Nash, Null Preemption, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1015, 1073–74 (2010) (arguing that
states are entitled to “special solicitude” to challenge an agency’s failure to regulate, when
state law is preempted); Nash, supra note 1, at 206 (advocating state standing when the
state alleges “the Executive Branch has underenforced the federal law in a way that is
inconsistent with a governing statute” and Congress has preempted state law); Roesler,
supra note 1, at 641–42, 679–81 (arguing that “states should have ‘governance’ standing to
challenge federal power and action when the federal law at issue contemplates an imple-
mentation role for state governments,” and supporting standing in Massachusetts v. EPA as
authorized by Congress).  Notably, some scholarly endorsements are more qualified. See
Metzger, supra note 6, at 67–75 (exploring the possibility that states may be effective
monitors of federal agencies but suggesting that Congress should decide whether states
ought to play such a special role).  Jessica Bulman-Pozen thoughtfully suggests that state
standing could stimulate the political process by encouraging negotiations between federal
and state officials. See Bulman-Pozen, supra note 1, at 1744, 1748–49 (asserting that state
lawsuits may encourage “the President or federal agency officials [to] come to the table”
and bargain with state officials).
15 Scholars use a variety of terms for this concept—“nationwide injunctions,” “univer-
sal injunctions,” and “national injunctions.”  I use the term “national injunction” to mean
an injunction that is enforceable by both nonparties and parties to the lawsuit.  For a small
sample of the rich debate on this topic, compare Samuel L. Bray, Multiple Chancellors:
Reforming the National Injunction, 131 HARV. L. REV. 417, 420–23 (2017) (arguing that “[a]
federal court should . . . enjoin[ ] the [federal] defendant’s conduct only with respect to
the plaintiff”), and Michael T. Morley, Nationwide Injunctions, Rule 23(b)(2), and the Remedial
Powers of the Lower Courts, 97 B.U. L. REV. 615, 620 (2017) (arguing that nationwide injunc-
tions should be granted “if at all . . . only under certain narrow circumstances”), with
Amanda Frost, In Defense of Nationwide Injunctions, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1065, 1069 (2018)
(offering a qualified defense); see also Zachary D. Clopton, National Injunctions and Preclu-
sion, 117 MICH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019) (urging that the rules of preclusion provide
guidance on this issue).
16 See Mank & Solimine, supra note 13, at 1958 (“[B]efore issuing [national injunc-
tions], courts should take into account factors such as the number and geographic and
partisan diversity of the states, who (attorney general or governor) is representing a state,
and which one or more states are opposing the decrees, as parties or amici curiae.”).  Like-
wise, in his characteristically careful and thoughtful fashion, Nash offers a qualified
endorsement.  He suggests that, although states and private parties should generally be
treated the same at the remedial stage, states may deserve special access to nationwide
relief when they (alone) can bring suit. See Jonathan Remy Nash, State Standing for Nation-
wide Injunctions Against the Federal Government, 94 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1985, 1987–88,
2011–13 (2019).
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One might wonder why states warrant “special solicitude”—that is, access
to court over and above that of private parties—at either the standing or the
remedial stage.  Scholars continue to debate this issue, but there are some
common themes.  State attorneys general (who represent the state in the
bulk of cases) are politically accountable officials who seem likely to bring
actions in the public interest.17  Moreover, there are a limited number of
state attorneys general (fifty), so broad state standing will not flood the fed-
eral courts with cases.  Under this view, “[s]tate attorneys general have lim-
ited resources and are politically constrained” and thus will likely target
“[o]nly particularly egregious executive violations of public rights.”18
As I have suggested in prior work,19 there are reasons to doubt these
assumptions.  State officials may not be better positioned than private parties
to police the federal executive’s handling of federal law.  First, a state attor-
ney general has an obligation to represent the interests of her state, not the
national public interest.20  Second, in an era of growing party polarization,21
state attorneys general may be motivated by partisanship, rather than a broad
conception of the public interest.22  Indeed, many recent “State v. United
States” lawsuits could be seen as efforts by state officials to go after their polit-
17 See Hessick, supra note 12, at 1949 (“[U]nlike individuals, states are democratically
accountable bodies . . . . A state’s decision to bring suit thus does not subvert the political
process; instead it reflects the views of the people as embodied by their elected officials.”);
Massey, supra note 14, at 274–75, 279 (“Not only is the number of possible plaintiffs
reduced to fifty, the political process within each state will likely operate to restrain whole-
sale challenges to the exercise of federal executive discretion.”); Young, supra note 11, at
1914 (“One significant advantage that states have over private organizations and class
actions is that they have built-in mechanisms of democratic accountability for their con-
duct of litigation on behalf of their citizens.”).
18 Massey, supra note 14, at 274, 279.
19 See Grove, supra note 1, at 895–99.
20 See NAT’L ASS’N OF ATTORNEYS GEN., STATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL: POWERS AND
RESPONSIBILITIES 47–49, 84 & n.1 (Emily Myers ed., 3d ed. 2013); id. 88 (“The vast majority
of the attorneys general have a duty to litigate, affirmatively and defensively, on behalf of
client agencies.”).
21 Mark D. Brewer, The Rise of Partisanship and the Expansion of Partisan Conflict Within
the American Electorate, 58 POL. RES. Q. 219, 219–20 (2005) (“By the end of the 1980s, parti-
sanship in Congress had risen dramatically and has remained at a high level ever since.”
(citations omitted)); Gary C. Jacobson, A House and Senate Divided: The Clinton Legacy and
the Congressional Elections of 2000, 116 POL. SCI. Q. 5, 6 (2001) (stating that in the 1990s, “the
stark partisan polarization among the parties’ politicians . . . accelerated”).
22 See, e.g., Colin Provost, When Is AG Short for Aspiring Governor? Ambition and Policy
Making Dynamics in the Office of State Attorney General, 40 PUBLIUS 597, 603 (2009) (“Gener-
ally, we can expect AGs to push hard on issues for which they feel confident they will get
support from the electorate and from state elites.”); see also Neal Devins & Saikrishna Ban-
galore Prakash, Fifty States, Fifty Attorneys General, and Fifty Approaches to the Duty to Defend,
124 YALE L.J. 2100, 2150–54 (2015) (urging that state attorneys general are increasingly
likely to be motivated by partisanship); Margaret H. Lemos, State Enforcement of Federal Law,
86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 698, 729–30 (2011) (“Republican attorneys general running for re-elec-
tion or higher office in 2010 emphasized issues like combating child pornography, while
Democrats were more likely to highlight the environment . . . .”).
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ical opponents on a national stage.23  Republican attorneys general—led by
Texas—attacked Obama-era policies, such as the deferred action programs
for undocumented immigrants.24  With President Trump in the White
House, the litigation incentives have flipped; now Democratic attorneys gen-
eral—led by New York and California—challenge the Trump administra-
tion’s policies on immigration, the environment, and health insurance.25
Some supporters of broad state standing are sensitive to the issues of
party polarization.  They suggest that courts ought to take such concerns into
account.  Courts could, for example, grant standing and nationwide relief
only when the state lawsuit has bipartisan support.26  At first glance, this
approach has considerable appeal.  But I do want to offer a cautionary note:
it is not clear that federal courts are institutionally suited (much less willing)
to examine the ideological background of the litigants before them.
In past work, I proposed a more limited scope for special state standing
against the federal government.  My argument built on the fact that states
have long had the power to go to court when private parties could not: states
may enforce and defend state law, absent any showing of concrete injury.27  I
23 In recent work, Margaret Lemos and Ernest Young caution that we should not
assume state attorneys general have uniformly partisan motivations.  For example, many
state suits against corporations have bipartisan support.  But the authors recognize that
partisanship seems more likely to influence state suits challenging the federal executive’s
handling of federal law. See Margaret H. Lemos & Ernest A. Young, State Public-Law Litiga-
tion in an Age of Polarization, 97 TEX. L. REV. 43, 86–92, 94 (2018) (“[S]tate litigation against
business interests tends to be more bipartisan than state litigation against the federal gov-
ernment.”).  These “State v. United States” cases are at the heart of the state standing
literature.
24 See cases cited supra note 9.  Many of those same officials have continued this litiga-
tion into the Trump administration, seeking the federal judiciary’s assistance in terminat-
ing Obama-era policies. See Lauren McGaughy, With Trump in Charge, Why Is Texas Still
Suing the Federal Government? Because Now It Can Win, DALLAS MORNING NEWS (Feb. 8, 2018),
https://www.dallasnews.com/news/texas-politics/2018/02/08/trump-charge-texas-still-
suing-federal-government-now-can-win (“Thanks to a like-minded partner in the White
House, Texas is now winning more lawsuits against the U.S. government than ever
before. . . . Most of these suits target policies put in place by Democratic presidents . . . .”).
25 See Neuhauser, supra note 7; David Schultz, Blue Wave Roils Environmental Lawsuits as
States Turn to Courts, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 8, 2019), https://news.bloombergenvironment.
com/environment-and-energy/blue-wave-roils-environmental-lawsuits-as-states-turn-to-
courts.
26 See Hessick & Marshall, supra note 1, at 103, 105–08 (encouraging courts “to relax
the injury in fact test for states” suing the federal executive “but impose prudential con-
straints” on those lawsuits by requiring states to show bipartisan support for any challenge,
and by ensuring that a given official has the power to represent the state ); Mank &
Solimine, supra note 13, at 1958 (“[B]efore issuing [national injunctions], courts should
take into account factors such as the number and geographic and partisan diversity of the
states, who (attorney general or governor) is representing a state, and which one or more
states are opposing the decrees, as parties or amici curiae.”).
27 See Grove, supra note 1, at 858–62; see also Hollingsworth v. Perry, 570 U.S. 693,
709–10 (2013) (“No one doubts that a State has a cognizable interest ‘in the continued
enforceability’ of its laws . . . .” (quoting Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 137 (1986)); Tara
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\94-5\NDL501.txt unknown Seq: 7 16-JUL-19 7:35
2019] foreword:  some  puzzles  of  state  standing 1889
showed that, historically, states could assert that same interest in suits against
the United States; that is, states could challenge federal statutes or agency
regulations that preempted state law.28  Drawing on this history and prece-
dent, I offered a limiting principle for special state standing: states have
broad standing to sue the federal government to protect state law (as in pre-
emption cases), but not to oversee the federal executive’s implementation of
federal law.29  Such a principle, I argued, would more carefully map onto the
political incentives of state attorneys general; after all, they are selected to
further the interests of the residents of their respective states, not to protect
the national interest.30  In his thoughtful contribution to this Symposium,
Robert Mikos challenges this (more limited) scope of state standing, ques-
tioning whether states should even have a special power to enforce and
defend their laws in federal court.31  His work powerfully unsettles many
assumptions about state access to federal court.32
Leigh Grove, Government Standing and the Fallacy of Institutional Injury, 167 U. PA. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at 22–25) [hereinafter Grove, Government Standing],
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3134464 (underscoring that this
principle is well established for both the state and the federal governments).  In sharp
contrast, the Supreme Court has made clear that private parties lack standing to protect
the “continued enforceability” of state law, absent a showing of concrete injury. See Hol-
lingsworth, 570 U.S. at 705–15 (rejecting private party standing to defend a state law ban-
ning same-sex marriage, given that the private actors’ “only interest was to vindicate the
constitutional validity of a generally applicable California law,” but making clear that the
state government could have defended the law); Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 64–67
(1986) (holding that a private individual, who strongly opposed abortion, lacked standing
to defend a restrictive Illinois abortion statute, but stating that the State would have stand-
ing to defend the statute).
28 See Grove, supra note 1, at 863–72.
29 See id. 854–56 (“States . . . should have standing to challenge federal action that
preempts, or otherwise undermines the enforceability of, state law—and thereby hinders
the capacity of States to exercise self-government. . . . In sum, . . . States have broad stand-
ing to protect federalism principles, not the constitutional separation of powers.”).  To be
clear, I did not assert that a state has standing to challenge any federal action that arguably
undermines federalism, such as a statute that may exceed federal power.  Instead, my con-
tention was that state standing to preserve state law helps to safeguard core federalism
principles. See id. at 855 n.18.  In their contribution to this Symposium, Ann Woolhandler
and Michael Collins powerfully question whether my proposal sufficiently limits state
access to federal court. See Ann Woolhandler & Michael G. Collins, Reining in State Stand-
ing, 94 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2015, 2027 n.67 (2019) (emphasizing that “[i]t is common for
a federal regulation to trump state law”); see also Robert A. Mikos, Standing for Nothing, 94
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2033, 2047–48 (2019) (expressing a similar concern).
30 See Grove, supra note 1, at 895–99.
31 See Mikos, supra note 29, at 2036 (“[P]roponents of protective standing have over-
stated the need for and value of standing to protect state law.”).
32 This brief Foreword is not the place to respond to Mikos’s thoughtful essay.  For
present purposes, I will simply note that it has long been settled that states may defend
their laws, even in circumstances when private parties cannot do so. See supra note 27
(noting that in Hollingsworth v. Perry and Diamond v. Charles, the Supreme Court denied
standing to private parties to defend a state law because the private litigants lacked a con-
crete injury, but the Court made clear that the state government itself could have defended
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II. PUZZLE TWO: EQUAL STANDING?
Many commentators (myself included) have assumed that, at a mini-
mum, states should have the same power as private parties to sue the federal
government.  For example, if a state alleges that the federal executive
breached a contract by cutting off federal funds, the state may sue to redress
that pocketbook injury.33  Ernest Young forcefully defends (at least) this
equal status.34  Along the same lines, Katherine Mims Crocker argues that
this assumption may justify many lawsuits against the federal executive, if
states are treated as analogous to private associations.35
But several contributors to this Symposium powerfully challenge this
notion of “equality.”  States, they argue, simply cannot be treated like private
litigants.  As Ann Woolhandler and Michael Collins point out, states—in
their role as operators of public universities, police departments, prisons,
healthcare networks, and highways and other infrastructure programs—may
be injured by an almost infinite number of federal actions.36  By contrast, “a
private party does not have limitless interests . . . . An internet content pro-
vider may claim some injury from the Federal Communications Commis-
sion’s retreat from net neutrality, but it obviously [could not] challenge the
child separation policies of the Department of Homeland Security.”37  Along
similar lines, building on his own recent work, Seth Davis contends that com-
mentators need to more carefully parse the cases in which states suffer a
“concrete” harm; not all state injuries—even financial injuries—are truly
comparable to those of private entities.38
This research suggests an intriguing possibility: courts may need to
accord states less access to federal court (in theory) in order to equalize state
the law absent any showing of concrete injury).  Accordingly, I am not as confident as
Mikos that when another party brings suit, states could “adequately . . . defend their laws
without resort to protective standing,” that is, playing by the same standing rules that apply to
private parties.  Mikos, supra note 29, at 2035.
33 See, e.g., South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 205–06, 211–12 (1987) (upholding,
against a Spending Clause challenge, a federal law that required states to raise the mini-
mum drinking age to twenty-one or risk losing federal highway funds); Grove, supra note 1,
at 867–69 (observing that, although the Dole Court did not mention standing, the State
had a concrete pecuniary interest in the federal funds).
34 See Young, supra note 11, at 1896–1902, 1909–15 (arguing for equal standing and
arguing against any special disabilities for state plaintiffs).
35 See Katherine Mims Crocker, An Organizational Account of State Standing, 94 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 2057, 2059 (2019) (contending that “the legal community should feel at least
as comfortable with lawsuits led by states as with lawsuits led by other associations”).
36 Woolhandler & Collins, supra note 29, at 2024–26 (urging that, given the breadth of
potential state interests, the injury-in-fact test provides no “meaningful limit on state
standing”).
37 Id. at 2024–25 (“As applied to individuals and private organization[s], the injury-in-
fact requirement provides at least some limits . . . .”).
38 See Seth Davis, The Private Rights of Public Governments, 94 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2091,
2091 (2019) (doubting that one should always assume governments have standing to sue
based upon their private rights); see also Davis, supra note 1.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\94-5\NDL501.txt unknown Seq: 9 16-JUL-19 7:35
2019] foreword:  some  puzzles  of  state  standing 1891
and private plaintiffs (in fact).39  This possibility suggests the need for more
work (along the lines of Davis’s impressive scholarship), tackling when states’
apparently “concrete” injuries should be treated as judicially cognizable.40
Courts should perhaps also be more attentive to the causation and redres-
sability elements of standing doctrine—ensuring that the relief sought by the
state connects to its asserted injury.41  An alternative approach is to dispense
altogether with the injury-causation-redressability standard, and articulate an
entirely new test for state standing.
Of course, as Aziz Huq thoughtfully reminds us, in answering any of the
questions of state standing, we must be attentive not simply to precedent and
history (standard fare for federal courts scholarship).42  We must also con-
sider politics and party polarization, litigant incentives (particularly those of
state attorneys general), and how different standing rules may impact the
enforcement of structural constitutional values.43
In keeping with those broader themes, in separate work, I have
expressed concern about the risks that intergovernmental litigation may pose
to the federal judiciary.  To the extent that federal courts become embroiled
in (what at least appear to be) increasingly partisan disputes, that may not
bode well for the long-term future of the third branch.44  Other scholars
have likewise begun to consider state standing in a broader institutional con-
text.45  I am confident that this trend will continue.
39 Cf. Woolhandler & Collins, supra note 29, at 2015 (“While one might agree that the
states are not normal litigants, that abnormality might well suggest that states should get
standing less easily than private parties.” (footnote omitted)).
40 Alternatively, one could adopt Young’s approach and embrace the possibility that
states may have standing to challenge a virtually unlimited range of federal action—and,
thus, in practice, have greater access to federal court than private parties. See Young, supra
note 11, at 1895–96 (“States are . . . likely to enjoy broad standing even under ordinary
Article III analysis.”).
41 In my past work on state standing, I have underscored the need to connect the
“injury” to the other aspects of the standing analysis. See Grove, supra note 1, at 888–90,
893–95, 895 n.215.
42 See Aziz Z. Huq, State Standing’s Uncertain Stakes, 94 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2127, 2132
(2019) (emphasizing the importance of “articulat[ing] the interesting normative conse-
quences of narrowing or widening the Article III gauge in this contested class”).
43 See id. at 2140.
44 In prior work, I have raised concerns about how government-initiated lawsuits (by
states and other government entities) will impact the federal judiciary in the long run. See
Grove, Government Standing, supra note 27 (manuscript at 42, 45–47); Tara Leigh Grove,
Essay, Justice Scalia’s Other Standing Legacy, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 2243, 2259–64 (2017).  These
concerns may be even more pressing today, given the recent challenges to judicial inde-
pendence. See Tara Leigh Grove, The Supreme Court’s Legitimacy Dilemma, 132 HARV. L. REV.
2240 (2019) (reviewing RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., LAW AND LEGITIMACY IN THE SUPREME
COURT (2018)) (discussing recent attacks on the federal judiciary).
45 See, e.g., supra notes 22–23 and accompanying text (describing how scholars have
taken note of the apparently partisan nature of “State v. United States” disputes).
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CONCLUSION
State lawsuits against the federal government raise challenging questions
of constitutional law, party polarization, remedies, and the proper scope of
the federal judicial power.  The pieces in this Symposium helpfully elucidate
this debate and offer several steps forward.  Scholars will undoubtedly pick
up on these themes in future work, as state litigants continue to press the
boundaries of their “special” standing.  Indeed, with all the puzzles surround-
ing state standing, one thing seems fairly clear: state lawsuits against the fed-
eral government are not going away any time soon.
